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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - Equal Protection - Af-
firmative Action Plan Upheld Absent Prior Finding of
Discrimination. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S.
Ct. 2721 (1979). IN Regents of the University of California
v. Bakke,1 the United States Supreme Court first set forth its
views on an issue of increasing public controversy - affirma-
tive action. Affirmative action is a recently developed concept
which revolves around the precept of extending preferential
treatment to minorities. An affirmative action plan is a special
effort to increase the number of minorities in any particular
program or job category. The plan often takes the form of a
quota system, relaxed hiring standards, or increased recruiting
of minorities. The goal of an affirmative action plan is to ame-
liorate the effects of past discriminatory practices.'
The Bakke decision3 represented a somewhat confused ap-
proval of affirmative action. Bakke indicated that while racial
considerations in formulating affirmative action plans were ac-
ceptable, quotas which explicitly excluded nonminorities were
inappropriate.
However, the Court in Bakke failed to reach a consensus of
opinion.4 Justice Powell, who provided the deciding vote,
stated that there is "a substantial interest that legitimately
may be served by a properly devised admissions program in-
volving the competitive consideration of race and ethnic ori-
gin."5 However, the admission program in Bakke was invali-
1. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
2. See generally Harkins, Affirmative Action: The Constitution, Jurisprudence
and the Formulation of Policy, 26 KAN. L. REv. 85 (1977); Renfrew, Affirmative Ac-
tion: A Plea for a Rectification Principle, 9 Sw. U.L. REv. 597 (1977).
3. In Bakke, a white male was denied admission to a medical school in two con-
secutive years. Bakke claimed that he was denied admission because of a special ad-
missions program in which only minorities were considered for 16 of the 100 places in
the entering class. In the two years Bakke applied, these minorities had had lower
admission scores, on the average, than Bakke. On certiorari, the United States Su-
preme Court split on several issues. Five members of the Court agreed that the medi-
cal school's program was invalid and at least five members were of the opinion that
race could be considered in future admissions processes.
4. For a comprehensive discussion of the various opinions filed in Bakke, see gen-
erally Tribe, Perspectives on Bakke: Equal Protection, Procedural Fairness, or
Structural Justice, 92 HARv. L. REv. 864 (1979).
5. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978).
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dated because it "involve[d] the use of an explicit racial
classification" designed to exclude nonminority applicants
from a specified percentage of available seats.
Chief Justice Burger, Justices Stewart, Rehnquist and Ste-
vens concurred in part and dissented in part. Their opinion
focused on the statutory language of Title VI.7 They wrote,
"[T]he meaning of the Title VI ban on exclusion is crystal
clear: Race cannot be the basis of excluding anyone from par-
ticipation in a federally funded program."B
Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun con-
cluded that the admissions program was constitutional, stat-
ing that the university's "articulated purpose of remedying
the effects of past societal discrimination is . .. sufficiently
important to justify the use of race-conscious admissions pro-
grams where there is a sound basis for concluding that minor-
ity underrepresentation is substantial and chronic."'
The Supreme Court next faced the issue of affirmative ac-
tion in United Steelworkers v. Weber.10 In Weber, the Su-
preme Court clearly held that under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,11 private employers may voluntarily adopt
race-conscious quota systems to abrogate the effects of past
discriminatory practices. 12 No pattern of discrimination by
the employer need be shown. Although Weber approved the
use of quota systems to correct manifest racial imbalance in
traditionally all-white job categories, the Court's decision
should not be interpreted as a blanket approval of all affirma-
tive action plans. The fundamental question was not ad-
dressed by the Court; that is, what are the limits of a permis-
sible affirmative action plan.
Although the Court did not directly establish the limits of
affirmative action programs,13 three basic guidelines can be
identified. Generally, affirmative action programs will be up-
6. Id. at 319.
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-4 (1976).
8. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 418 (1978) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
9. Id. at 362 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
10. 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17 (1976).
12. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721, 2730 (1979).
13. Id. at 2730.
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held if they do not require the displacement of nonminority
workers; do not unnecessarily intrude on rights of nonmi-
nority employees (e.g., advancement); and the programs are
instituted to correct a racial imbalance in the work force.
This note will -examine these guidelines and analyze the
probable impact of the Weber decision on future affirmative
action plans. Since the majority view in Weber represents a
departure from prior interpretations of Title VII, it must nec-
essarily be examined in light of the history of Title VII. Addi-
tionally, the principles set forth by Weber will be contrasted
with those established by Bakke.
I. United Steelworkers v. Weber
Respondent, Brian Weber, a white employee of Kaiser
Aluminum & Chemical Corp., was denied admission to an on-
the-job training program under a racial quota system by
which majority and minority workers were admitted to a
craft-training program on a one-to-one basis. 14 The quota vol-
untarily imposed by petitioner, Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical
Corp., pursuant to its affirmative action obligations, resulted
in the admission to the program of black employees with less
seniority than white employees also seeking admission.15
Weber brought a class action on behalf of himself and all
other similarly situated employees arguing that the quota sys-
tem violated section 703(a) 6 and 703(d)" of Title VII of the
14. Kaiser Aluminum and the United Steelworkers Union entered into a collective
bargaining agreement which included an affirmative action plan designed to eliminate
conspicuous racial imbalances in Kaiser's, then almost exclusively white, craft work
forces by reserving for black employees fifty percent of the openings in the in-plant
craft training programs until the percentage of minority craft workers roughly
equaled the percentage of the minority population in the community surrounding the
plant. Kaiser created a program to train production workers to fill craft openings,
selecting trainees on the basis of seniority. To achieve its affirmative action goals, it
was necessary to create dual seniority lists. During the first year of the plan, seven
black and six white workers were selected from the plant production force. Most of
the blacks selected had less seniority than several white production workers whose
bids for admission were rejected. Id. at 2725-26.
15. Id. at 2725.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1976). Section 703(a) provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer. . . (2) to
limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment op-
portunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race. . ..
1979]
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Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court invalidated the
program because Kaiser Aluminum failed to establish past
hiring or promotion discrimination against minorities.18
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, 19 holding that
employment preferences based on race where no past discrim-
ination was shown, including preferences incidental to bona
fide affirmative action plans, violated Title VII's prohibition
against racial discrimination in employment. The Supreme
Court, however, in a five to two decision, reversed, 20 holding
that Title VII does not prohibit race-conscious affirmative ac-
tion plans. In upholding the Kaiser plan, the majority did not
define the line of demarcation between permissible and im-
permissible affirmative action plans. Rather, the Court merely
held this particular plan was permissible because no nonmi-
nority employees were discharged and nonminority interests
were not "trammel[led]."'
II. Bakke VERSUS Weber
The results reached in Bakke and Weber appear to be con-
tradictory. The former disapproves of the use of quotas, while
the latter gives limited approval to quotas. However, factual
and legal distinctions between the two cases justify the con-
flicting results.
The challenge to the affirmative action plan in Weber was
premised on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The
Court approved the plan holding that Title VII did not pro-
scribe the voluntary institution of race-conscious programs.22
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d) (1976). Section 703(d) provides: "It shall be an unlaw-
ful employment practice for any employer . . . controlling apprenticeship or other
training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs, to discriminate against
any individual because of his race . . . in admission to, or employment in, any pro-
gram established to provide apprenticeship or other training."
18. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 415 F. Supp. 761 (E.D. La. 1976),
aff'd, 563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd sub noam. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99
S. Ct. 2721 (1979).
19. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd
sub noam. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979).
20. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979). Justices Brennan, Stew-
art, White, Marshall and Blackmun joined the Court's opinion. Chief Justice Burger
and Justice Rehnquist filed dissenting opinions. Justices Powell and Stevens took no
part in the consideration or decision of the case.
21. Id. at 2730.
22. Id. at 2726-30.
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On the other hand, the challenge to the admissions program
in Bakke was premised on Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.23 This essential difference limits the rationale of Weber
to cases in which a violation of Title VII is alleged.
The scope of the two statutes is markedly different. The
prohibition of discrimination under Title VII applies to pri-
vate parties, 24 while the provisions of Title VI apply only to
public institutions receiving federal assistance.25 Further,
while the prohibition of race discrimination under Title VI is
closely related to the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment,26 the prohibition of race discrimination by pri-
vate parties under Title VII is not directly related to any con-
stitutional provision. The motivation behind Title VII was
correction of a social problem. It was not an attempt to partic-
ularize or enforce any provision of the fourteenth amend-
ment.2 7 This distinction becomes particularly important in de-
termining the overall applicability of Weber to equal
opportunity law.
The statutory language of Title VI and Title VII illustrates
23. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
24. Section 703(a)(1) states: "(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for
an employer - (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color .. " 42
U.S.C. § 200Oe-2(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
25. The relevant provisions of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are found
in § 601: "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or na-
tional origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial as-
sistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
26. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 328 (1978) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Brennan stated that
Title VI prohibits only those uses of racial criteria that would violate the Four-
teenth Amendment if employed by a State or its agencies; it does not bar the
preferential treatment of racial minorities as a means of remedying past socie-
tal discrimination to the extent that such action is consistent with the Four-
teenth Amendment.
Id. Bell, The Bakke Opinions and Equal Protection Doctrine, 14 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 327 (1979).
27. Senator Humphrey said in his speech introducing Title VII to the Senate:
"The constitutional basis for title VII is, of course, the commerce clause .... [I]f
Congress can prevent discrimination in employment on the basis of membership or
nonmembership in a labor union, as it does in the National Labor Relations Act, it
can prevent discrimination on the basis of race. . . ." 110 CONG. REc. 6548 (1964).
1979]
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the different emphasis of two sections. Title VII specifically
provides in section 703(j) that no employer will be required to
preferentially treat any individual in order to correct a racial
imbalance in the work force of a community.28 Title VI has no
comparable provision.
Furthermore, sections 703(a) and 703(d) of Title VII spe-
cifically refer to the regulation of the private sector while the
language of Title VI refers to any program receiving federal
assistance. In short, the literal prohibitions of Title VI and
Title VII reflect their different origins, histories and concerns
addressed. Consequently, because the basis of the Weber deci-
sion is inherently different from that of Bakke, Weber should
be limited to programs arising under Title VII.
The Weber Court also distinguished Bakke on a factual
basis. Since Bakke dealt with a state university receiving fed-
eral funds, the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment was a key area of dispute.29 Weber, on the other
hand, involved a private program with no governmental in-
volvement. Therefore the proscriptions of the fourteenth
amendment were not applicable. 30 This factual difference
played a vital role in the Court's decisionmaking process.
What initially appears to be a liberal decision is rooted in
conservative philosophy. The plan in Weber represented a
voluntary effort by both employer and union to ameliorate
past social injustice. They attempted, via collective bargain-
ing, to formulate a private solution to a public problem. This
principle of industrial self-determination was codifed in the
28. The relevant provisions of Section 703(j) state:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any em-
ployer . . . to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group
because of the race, [or] color .. . of such individual or group on account of an
imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of
persons of any race, [or] color. . . employed by any employer. . . in compari-
son with the total number or percentage of persons of such race, [or] color...
in any community, State, section or other area . 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j)
(1976).
29. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287 (1978). Justice Powell
observed in his majority opinion that "decisions based on race or ethnic origin by
faculties and administrations of state universities are reviewable under the Four-
teenth Amendment." Id.
30. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721, 2726 (1979). The Kaiser plan
was a result of a collective bargaining agreement between Kaiser Aluminum and the
United Steelworkers in which the federal government took no part. Id. at 2725.
[Vol. 63:311
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National Labor Relations Act31 and subsequently recognized
by the Supreme Court.32
The Court in Weber viewed restrictions on all voluntary
affirmative action programs as interfering with this principle
of self-determination. Consequently, the Weber majority
opted to refrain from interfering with private solutions to the
problem of racial imbalance in some job categories. This pub-
lic-private dichotomy not only aids in the distinction between
Weber and Bakke but also explains the Court's decisionmak-
ing rationale.
III. PRIOR INTERPRETATION OF TITLE VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that it is
an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discrim-
inate against any individual with respect to the terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, or to limit, segregate or
classify his employees so as to deprive any individual of em-
ployment opportunities because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.33 The first case inter-
preting this language was Griggs v. Duke Power Co." In
Griggs, the Court ruled that Title VII required the elimina-
tion of artificial barriers to employment that operate to dis-
criminate on the basis of race.35 Griggs indicated that the
scope of relief under Title VII would be broadly interpreted
by the courts .3 This is exemplified in Griggs where the Court
looked beyond practices facially neutral to find a Title VII vi-
olation when such practices acted to perpetuate prior discrim-
ination.37 However, the Court was careful to point out that
there were restrictions on this broad remedial approach. Jus-
tice Burger stated, "Discriminatory preference for any groups,
minority or majority, is precisely and only what Congress has
proscribed. What is required by Congress is the removal of
31. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1976).
32. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 778-79 (1976); Ford Motor Co.
v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 342 (1953).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976).
34. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
35. Id. at 429-33.
36. Id.
37. Chief Justice Burger wrote: "The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination
but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation." Id. at 431.
19791
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artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment
when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the
basis of racial or other impermissible classification. '3 8 The
mandate in Griggs was subsequently ignored by the Weber
majority.
Despite the broad scope of sections 703(a) and (d) of Title
VII, judicial authority to impose remedies which include racial
quotas is not clear.39 Section 703(j) contains language which
appears to prohibit the use of any preferential quotas. While a
literal reading of 703(j) appears to prohibit the use of quotas,
it has been interpreted to prohibit preferential treatment only
when based solely on numerical racial imbalance where past
discriminatory employment practice was not a factor. Where
past discriminatory practices were established, the courts uni-
formly held that preferential treatment could be considered
appropriate relief.40 An illustrative case is Rios v. Enterprise
Association of Steamfitters, Local 638,41 in which the United
States sought an injunction against the union from further
discrimination against nonwhite workers. The Court of Ap-
peals upheld a thirty percent fixed goal for union integration,
stating that once a violation of Title VII is established, a dis-
trict court has broad remedial powers to erase the vestiges of
past discrimination.,2
Although courts acknowledged their broad remedial pow-
ers once discrimination was proven, some courts criticized the
use of quotas merely to correct racial imbalance where no
prima facie case of discrimination was established. 3 In
38. Id.
39. See generally Note, 12 GA. L. REv. 669 (1978).
40. Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 273-74 (4th Cir. 1976);
Southern Ill. Builders Ass'n v. Ogilvie, 471 F.2d 680, 683-86 (7th Cir. 1972); United
States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 552-53 (9th Cir 1971).
41. 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974).
42. Id. at 629.
43. See Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 325 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 950 (1972); Cox v. Allied Chem. Corp., 382 F. Supp. 309, 319 (M.D. La. 1974).
In Anderson v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 357 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Cal.
1972), the court stated:
[T]hus, any classification based on race is suspect. Such classifications have
been allowed by the courts, but only to correct past discriminatory practices.
In the instant case there has been no showing that the classifications and dis-
criminations on the basis of race to be put into effect .... are to be under-
taken to correct past discrimination.
[Vol. 63:311
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United States v. Wood, Wire, and Metal Lathers Interna-
tional Union, Local 46," the court found evidence of past dis-
crimination in the issuance of union work permits. While or-
dering the issuance of one hundred permits to minority
workers the court expressed reservations about its ability to
do so in all circumstances. The court wrote, "while quotas
merely to attain racial balance are forbidden, quotas to cor-
rect past discriminatory practices are not. '4 5
In sum, although the courts recognized that preferential
numerical treatment was permissible to correct effects of past
discrimination, it remained an extraordinary remedy not ap-
propriate in all cases.46
The Supreme Court again addressed Title VII in McDon-
ald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co.-" In McDonald, the
Court held that the protection of Title VII was not limited to
members of any particular race."8 Although McDonald clearly
held that Title VII applies uniformly to all individuals regard-
less of race, the Court specifically reserved ruling on the ap-
propriateness of affirmative action programs under Title VII.4
This reservation helped the Weber majority to sidestep the
express mandate of McDonald.
Before Weber only two lower courts addressed the issue of
voluntarily instituted preferential hiring in an employment
context.5 0 Reeves v. Eaves51 involved preferential treatment
No authority presently exists to uphold a practice which discriminates on
racial or ethnic lines which is not being implemented to correct a prior discrim-
inatory situation.
Id. at 250 (emphasis in original).
44. 471 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1973).
45. Id. at 413.
46. See note 37 supra. For a general overview of the key cases, see Jones, Equal
Employment Law in the Twenty-First Century, 39 OHio ST. L.J. 700 (1978).
47. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
48. The Court stated in McDonald that "Title VII was intended to 'cover white
men and white women and all Americans,'. . . . We therefore hold today that Title
VII prohibits racial discrimination against the white petitioners in this case upon the
same standards as would be applicable were they [minorities]." Id. at 280 (citiations
omitted).
49. Id. at 281 n.8. The Weber majority recognized that McDonald did not rule on
the appropriateness of quotas under Title VII. 99 S. Ct. at 2726.
50. A third case, Cramer v. Virginia Commonwealth Univ., 415 F. Supp. 673 (E.D.
Va. 1976), involved preferential treatment under which two women were selected for
a faculty position before an equally or better qualified male. The district court held
that the hiring plan of the university violated Title VII even though the program was
19791
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under which nonminority police officers were discriminated
against in favor of less qualified minorities in order to create a
racial balance on the police force. The district court held that
affirmative action did not include unilateral discrimination by
the police department in favor of less qualified applicants on
the basis of race or the lowering of qualification standards so
as to impair the department's overriding function of protect-
ing persons and property. The court was explicit in its holding
that if preferential action is necessary to overcome the effects
of prior discrimination, it must come by court decree.2
In a similar case in California, Anderson v. San Francisco
Unified School District s the district court addressed the per-
missibility of percentage quotas in promotion of school ad-
ministrative personnel. Although Anderson was decided under
Title VI, the fact that it arose within the context of a volunta-
rily instituted hiring program makes it relevant to the present
discussion. Title VI did not play a crucial role in the court's
reasoning, rather it simply applies because the school district
was receiving federal funds.
The quota system in Anderson was designed to achieve
ethnic balance in school administrative personnel approximat-
ing the racial and ethnic distribution of the total school popu-
voluntarily instituted in compensation for alleged past societal discrimination in hir-
ing women. The court felt that reliance upon preferential treatment to correct alleged
past deficiencies in hiring constituted unconstitutional means to achieve constitu-
tional ends. Id. at 678-79.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals later vacated the district court's judgment
and remanded the case for further findings of fact and conclusions of law in light of
the Bakke decision. Cramer v. Virginia Commonwealth Univ., 586 F.2d 297 (4th Cir.
1978).
51. 411 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
52. The same district court denied the employer's motion to stay a preliminary
injunction of the preferential program. Reeves v. Eaves, 415 F. Supp. 1141 (N.D. Ga.
1976). In that case the court stated:
There will be few who would challenge the proposition that, in view of their
almost equal proportions in the city's population, the proportion of blacks to
the total force should be larger. But reverse discrimination is not the'answer.
Affirmative action is permissible to eliminate and remedy the effects of past
discrimination, otherwise discrimination on the basis of race is prohibited
There has been no finding of past discrimination in this case, .... [b]ut,
even assuming that point, preferential minority hiring is the province of the
Court, not the defendant.
Id. at 1147-48 (citations omitted).
53. 357 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
[Vol. 63:311
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lation. Because of budget restriction, reduced enrollment, and
the adoption of a freeze on administrative appointments by
the school district, the quota acted as a bar to all nonminority
advancement.5 4 The court held that the white plaintiffs were
being "systematically excluded from promotions, advance-
ment, and compensation in their chosen profession solely on
the ground of their race.''55
In short, the lower court decisions dealing with voluntarily
initiated preferential programs held the programs invalid ab-
sent a court order. But neither court specifically addressed the
issue of whether any quota system voluntarily enacted was
proscribed by Title VII.
IV. THE RATIONALE OF Weber
The import of Weber lies in its approval of voluntarily ini-
tiated preferential programs designed to remedy the absence
of minorities in traditionally segregated job categories. The
decision does not provide a blanket approval of quota sys-
tems. Further, the critical question of defining the limits of a
permissible program was unanswered.
The Weber majority based its decision on the intent of the
legislature in formulating Title VII.56 Title VII was intended
by Congress, the majority wrote, "to open employment oppor-
tunities for Negroes in occupations which have been tradition-
ally closed to them.' ' 57 The majority further relied on the stat-
utory and judicial emphasis on voluntary conciliation under
Title VII.5 8 These two reasons led the majority in Weber to
conclude that voluntarily instituted affirmative action pro-
grams were not violative of Title VII.59
54. Id. at 253-55.
55. Id. at 253.
56. See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721, 2727 (1979).
57. Id. at 2728 (quoting remarks of Sen. Humphrey, 110 CONG. REC. 6548 (1964)).
58. In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974), the Court stated:
[C]ooperation and voluntary compliance were selected as the preferred means
for achieving this goal [equal employment opportunity]. To this end, Congress
created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and established a
procedure whereby existing state and local equal employment opportunity
agencies, as well as the Commission, would have an opportunity to settle dis-
putes through conference, conciliation, and persuasion before the aggrieved
party was permitted to file a lawsuit.
59. The Court in Weber wrote "[i]t would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a
Nation's concern over centuries of racial injustice ... constituted the first legislative
1979]
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The main problem faced by the Court was reconciling cer-
tain sections of Title VII which seem to prohibit preferential
treatment. The majority examined sections 703(a) and 703 (d)
and concluded that the Court should look beyond their literal
meaning to the intent of Congress. ° In this manner, the ma-
jority circumvented any literal prohibition of preferential
treatment in these sections.
The majority's largest obstacle was the language of section
703(j) which does not require employers to institute preferen-
tial treatment to correct racial imbalances. The Court held
that although section 703(j) does not require preferential
treatment, it did not proscribe voluntary imposition of a
quota system.
The Court found the following language to be ambiguous:
"Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to
require any employer . . . to grant preferential treatment."6 1
The ambiguity was whether the word "require" proscribed
voluntarily imposed programs.6 2 Having isolated the ambigu-
ous language, the Court was then free to look to congressional
intent.
It appears that the Weber majority reached their conclu-
sion at the expense of past precedent. The majority failed to
address their recent language in Furnco Construction Corp. v.
Waters.6 In Furnco, the Court stated "[i]t is clear beyond
cavil that the obligation imposed by Title VII is to provide an
equal opportunity for each applicant regardless of race, with-
out regard to whether members of the applicant's race are al-
ready proportionately represented in the work force." 6'
prohibition of all voluntary, private, race-conscious efforts to Abolish traditional pat-
terns of racial segregation and hierarachy." 99 S. Ct. at 2728.
60. It is a generally accepted maxim of statutory interpretation that a court can-
not look at legislative intent unless there exists some ambiguous language in the stat-
ute. J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, § 45.02 (4th ed. C.
Sands 1975). 1
61. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j)(1976).
62. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721, 2728-29 (1979).
63. 438 U.S. 567 (1978). In Furnco three black bricklayers had sought employ-
ment with petitioners, but two of them, although fully qualified, were not hired. The
Supreme Court held that the policy of not trainingblack bricklayers on the job was
racially neutral since the policy applied to both blacks and whites.
64. Id. at 579 (emphasis in original). A similar idea was expressed by Justice
Rehnquist in his dissent in Weber. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721,
2736 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also Sek v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 421 F.
[Vol. 63:311
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The factual similarity between Furnco and Weber indi-
cates that Furnco should have been persuasive precedent in
the Weber rationale. The failure to distinguish or reconcile
Furnco leaves a gaping hole in the Court's reasoning. The
Weber majority also failed to deal with the mandate of Griggs
v. Duke Power Company6 5 that discriminatory preference for
any group was proscribed by Title VII.66
Both Griggs and Furnco clearly indicated that Title VII
prohibited preferential treatment based solely on race. Since
past discriminatory practices by the employer were not estab-
lished in Weber, the accepted basis for approval of preferen-
tial treatment was lacking. Under pre-Weber standards the
Kaiser plan constituted a discriminatory preference for a cer-
tain racial group. The majority's approval of the plan de-
parted from prior case law.
The language of sections 703(a) and 703(d) is inconsistent
with the Court's holding. Both sections appear to proscribe
the very preference approved in Weber. Section 703(a) specifi-
cally prohibits the classification of employees in any manner
which would deprive those employees of employment oppor-
tunity because of race.6 7 The Kaiser plan concededly deprived
some nonminorities of the opportunity to participate in the
craft-training program. Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, felt the
majority misread congressional intent. He felt that Title VII
was not intended solely to protect minorities, but rather it
was designed to apply to all individuals regardless of race. 8
Therefore he condluded that section 703(a) limited the type
of preference involved in the Kaiser plan.
Section 703(d) states that an employer cannot discriminate
Supp. 983, 994 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd mem., 565 F.2d 153 (3d Cir. 1977); Frockt v. Olin
Corp., 344 F. Supp. 369, 370-71 (S.D. Ind. 1972).
65. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
66. Id. at 431.
67. See note 13 supra.
68. Justice Rehnquist wrote:
In passing Title VII Congress outlawed all racial discrimination, recogniz-
ing that no discrimination based on race is benign, that no action disadvantag-
ing a person because of his color is affirmative. With today's holding, the Court
introduces into Title VII a tolerance for the very evil that the law was intended
to eradicate, without offering even a clue as to what the limits of tolerance may
be.
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721, 2753 (1979)(Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing)(emphasis in original).
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against any individual because of race in admission to any
program established to provide appreticeship training.69 The
Kaiser plan did provide for preferential treatment in job-
training programs. The literal meaning of section 703(d) pro-
vides that all discrimination in job-training programs is pro-
hibited. This view that Title VII was intended to apply to all
individuals, both minorities and nonminorities, is further sup-
ported by the Furnco and Griggs decisions.
V. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AFTER Weber
Although the Weber Court approved the voluntary institu-
tion of affirmative action programs under Title VII, the fun-
damental question was unanswered - what are the permissi-
ble limits of such a program. The Court specifically withheld
decision on the characteristics of a permissible or impermissi-
ble program.7 0 This reflects the Court's attitude that Title VII
cases should be decided in light of each particular fact situa-
tion. The most important legacy of Weber is that in determin-
ing whether an affirmative action plan is permissible, it will be
appropriate to confine scrutiny to the program, and it is of
little significance whether the program was voluntary or
court-imposed. 71
While the main difficulty posed by Weber is its failure to
define the line of demarcation between impermissible and
permissible programs, it is possible to develop a general prog-
nosis for the future of affirmative action programs.
A voluntary quota system requiring the displacement of
white workers in favor of minorities will likely be held imper-
missible. The most prominent recent cases where a court re-
fused to uphold a quota system involved layoffs when such a
quota would have meant that whites lost their jobs.7 2 An af-
firmative action program is appropriate if it ensures that all
persons are afforded the same opportunity or considered for
benefits on the same basis, but the program will not be per-
69. See note 14 supra.
70. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721, 2730 (1979).
71. This same idea was expressed in Hollander v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 450 F.
Supp. 496, 502-03 (D. Conn. 1978).
72. Chance v. Board of Examiners, 534 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 965 (1977); Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d
420 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976).
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missible when it allocates a scarce resource such as jobs in
favor of one race to the detriment of others.73 This does not
mean that nonminorities cannot endure some intrusion on
their rights, rather it means that a system which directly dis-
places nonminorities is inherently unconstitutional. The
courts have viewed Title VII as not imposing the duty on em-
ployers to demote or discharge incumbent job holders in order
to make room for minorities who are victims of
discrimination. 4
The Supreme Court in United Jewish Organizations v.
Carey75 approved a reapportionment plan which used specific
numerical quotas to establish a certain number of black-ma-
jority voting districts. 6 The Court reasoned that racial consid-
erations if used in a purposeful manner were permissible be-
cause the plan would not impose any racial stigma on
nonminorities." An affirmative action program which specifi-
cally displaced nonminority workers would be imposing a ra-
cial stigma. Future affirmative action programs will likely not
be permissible if they have the effect of displacing
nonminorities.
The lower courts have developed a test to determine
whether a program unconstitutionally displaces nonminorities.
In Kirkland v. New York State Department of Correctional
Services,8 the court found a promotion examination discrimi-
natory. But the court, in searching for a proper remedy, con-
cluded that no one should be bumped from a preferred posi-
tion on an eligibility list solely because of race.79 Furthermore,
the court formulated a test under which quotas would be jus-
73. Flanagan v. Georgetown Univ., 417 F. Supp. 377 (D.D.C. 1976).
74. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 355
(1977); Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 267 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 920 (1976).
75. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
76. In Carey, the State of New York redrew the voting lines in Kings County in
order to enhance the opportunity for election of nonwhite representatives. The Court
held that the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments mandate no per se rule against
using racial factors in districting and apportionment. Permissible use of racial crite-
rion is not confined to eliminating the effects of past discriminatory districting or
apportionment.
77. Id. at 165. While Carey involved the Voting Rights Act of 1965, its discussion
of racial stigmata is appropriate to a discussion of Title VII.
78. 520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1975).
79. Id. at 429.
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tifiable if their effects are not identifiable, in other words, not
concentrated upon a relatively small, ascertainable group of
nonminority persons.8s
If a voluntarily imposed quota were permitted to displace
nonminority workers, the impact upon that group would be
direct, immediate and obvious. The key attribute of the plan
in Weber is that there was no direct impact, i.e., the effect of
the plan was not concentrated upon an ascertainable group of
white workers. Hence, the Weber Court has implicitly ap-
proved this trend toward avoiding the displacement of white
workers. To date, no federal court has approved a quota sys-
tem which displaces nonminority workers from their jobs.
A second consideration in the permissiblity of a quota pro-
gram is the extent to which the program excludes nonminori-
ties from participation in training programs and advancement.
If the program excludes nonminority workers from participa-
tion and they are given little chance for advancement, the
program approaches impermissible status. Most courts appear
to favor a temporary preference for victims of past discrimina-
tion rather than an absolute, inflexible quota system which
makes no allowance for employee merit, nonminority partici-
pation, and which may force an employer to hire less-qualifed
workers.81 The plan in Weber allowed reasonable participation
by white workers and insured adequate opportunity for ad-
vancement. The impact upon the interests of nonminorities
was not severe.
The effect of affirmative action programs on seniority
rights established under a collective bargaining agreement has
been the issue in a number of cases.8 2 Some courts have up-
80. Id. The court concluded that a hiring quota deals with the public at large,
none of whose members can be identified individually in advance. But a quota placed
on a small number of identifiable candidates only results in intensifying the effects of
the quota upon a small identifiable group. Id. See also EEOC v. Local 638, 532 F.2d
821 (2d Cir. 1976); Hollander v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 450 F. Supp. 496 (D. Conn.
1978).
81. See Patterson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union, 514 F.2d 767, 773 (2d
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 911 (1976); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Members
of the Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333, 1341 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. de-
nied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 331 (8th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972); EEOC v. Int'l Union of Elevator Constructors, Local No.
5, 398 F. Supp. 1237 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd, 538 F.2d 1012 (3d Cir. 1976).
82. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976); EEOC v. American
Tel. & Tel., 556 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom. Communications
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held hiring quotas while striking down promotional quotas
reasoning that promotional quotas have an impermissible dis-
criminatory effect on nonminority seniority rights.8 3 In Ander-
son v. San Francisco Unified School District, the quota sys-
tem was held invalid because nonminorities had been
excluded from any participation. But, nonminority seniority
rights have not been given absolute protection. The Supreme
Court recognized in International Brotherhood of Teamsters
v. United States8" that the legitimate expectations of nonmi-
nority employees may be intruded upon to the extent neces-
sary to correct the effects of discrimination. There must be a
balancing of legitimate nonminority seniority rights with the
goal of correcting the effects of past discriminatory practices.
The plan in Weber attempted to reach that balance by
providing that no rights or expectations of nonminority work-
ers were compromised unnecessarily. The 50-50 quota did in-
trude on expectations of some white workers but only to the
extent necessary to correct the racial imbalance in the work
force. In considering the permissibility of future quota sys-
tems, the participation of white workers and their opportunity
to advance will be critical in gaining court approval.
In evaluating future affirmative action programs, the Court
will likely avoid overly broad remedies which tend to trammel
white interests. A relationship between the nature and scope
of the remedy and the problem sought to be cured should be
established. 6 The Court's analysis involves three basic inquir-
ies: (1) Is the program conceived to cure a narrowly defined
problem;87 (2) Is the cause of the problem identified; (3) What
Workers v. EEOC, 438 U.S. 915 (1978).
83. Kirkland v. New York State Dep't. of Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d 420, 429
(2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976); Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v.
Young, 446 F. Supp. 979, 1010-12 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
84. 357 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
85. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
86. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 300-01 (1978) and
cases cited therein; Chance v. Board of Examiners, 534 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 965 (1977). See also Brief for Petitioner at 51-53, United Steelwork-
ers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979).
87. See EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel., 556 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied
sub nom. Communications Workers v. EEOC, 438 U.S. 915 (1978); Chance v. Board
of Examiners, 534 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 965 (1977). See also
Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 632 (2d Cir. 1974),
where the cdurt held that it would extend the preferential treatment remedy to mi-
1979]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
are the consequences of failing to correct the problem. The
Kaiser training program was conceived to cure the problem of
minority absence in the craft program. The problem was lim-
ited to racial imbalance between the black population and the
number of blacks in crafts. The cause of the problem was
identified - namely the minority inability to meet minimum
craft standards. Finally, a failure to correct the problem
would probably lead to widespread claims of discrimination
by black employees. In this sense, the courts should continue
to require future affirmative action programs to be in response
to a narrowly defined problem. A court will probably not de-
sign an overly broad remedy since that would increase the
likelihood of injury to nonminority workers.
The final area of inquiry is to what extent a racial imbal-
ance must exist in order to justify the use of an affirmative
action program. The Weber majority was explicit in their sup-
port of temporary measures designed to maintain racial bal-
ance.88 Prior to Weber, the Court addressed the issue of ra-
cial imbalance in United Jewish Organizations v. Carey.9
The Court was explicit in its use of specific numerical quotas
in establishing a certain number of black voting districts.90
The permissible use of racial criteria was not confined to elim-
inating the effects of past discrimination but was directed to-
ward eliminating a racial imbalance. 1 The Court did not de-
fine the degree of imbalance necessary to warrant the use of
racial criteria. At best, a delicate balance must be struck in
the use of quotas between the permissible elimination of ra-
cial imbalance and the involvement of the court in maintain-
ing racial balance which would constitute reverse discrimina-
tion.2 To approve of a program simply based on maintaining
an anticipated future increase in the nonwhite percent of the
population and work force would be to cross the line from
lawfully remedying the effects of past discrimination to un-
norities only to the extent that the minority had been discriminated against.
88. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721, 2730 (1979).
89. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
90. Id. at 161-62.
91. Id.
92. See Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir.
1974); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 984 (1971).
[Vol. 63:311
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
lawfully attempting to maintain a racial balance.93
The Bakke decision also recognized a widespread racial
imbalance between the number of minorities in law schools
and the minority population in general.9 4 The Court recog-
nized that race could be a consideration in correcting this im-
balance. Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion, stated
that a race-conscious program was permissible if the purpose
of the program was to remove a disparate racial imbalance
which can be attributed to society at large.9 5 It is clear from
Brennan's opinion that race-conscious measures must be a re-
sponse to either past discriminatory practices or some type of
racial imbalance. What is not clear is how much of an imbal-
ance must exist. The most solid conclusion to be drawn from
the case law is that a program instituted to maintain a racial
balance would probably constitute an arbitrary preference for
minorities without any real justification for its imposition.96
Since a racial imbalance will have to exist, the question re-
mains whether the Court will maintain a program when the
imbalance is comparatively slight. It is still open to question
how far the Court wanted to go in Weber. This is a key issue
which awaits further decision in cases now moving toward the
Court.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is evident from Weber that the Court has given its ap-
proval to the use of affirmative action quotas under Title VII.
The Court has interpreted Title VII as allowing private, vol-
untary, race-conscious affirmative action plans. But Weber
should not be viewed as approval for all types of quota sys-
tems. The Court limited its holding to a narrow statutory is-
sue involving Title VII and merely stated that the Kaiser plan
was permissible. Hence, Weber should be restricted only to its
limited approval of voluntarily instituted programs. The
93. See Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir.
1974).
94. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
95. Id. at 365-66 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
96. The Weber majority was explicit in its holding that some racial imbalance
must exist in order to justify an affirmative action program. To what extent the im-
balance must exist is open for debate. United7 Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721,
2730 (1979).
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Court was careful to point out that not every voluntarily insti-
tuted quota system is permissible.9
Prior to Weber the courts had required a showing of past
discriminatory practices before a preferential remedy could be
used. Weber has changed this perspective, and currently only
a showing of some racial imbalance in traditionally segregated
job categories is needed to justify preferential remedies. The
disturbing factor in Weber was the Court's failure to deal with
such past precedents as Furnco and Griggs. Because of this
omission, Weber is difficult to reconcile with previous deci-
sions which uniformly interpret Title VII as proscribing pref-
erential treatment for any race, absent a showing of past dis-
criminatory practices.
Even though the Court failed to define the boundary be-
tween permissible and impermissible programs, a few general
guidelines have emerged. First of all, it is apparent that courts
will not approve programs which require the displacement of
nonminorities. Secondly, the courts will not approve overly
broad remedies which have the effect of precluding white par-
ticipation and advancement under the program. Finally, there
must be some racial imbalance in the work force which the
program is designed to correct. Whether courts will approve a
quota system which is designed to correct only a slight imbal-
ance is still awaiting decision. Consequently, the permissibil-
ity of any affirmative action program will be judged on an ad
hoc basis.
JEFFREY S. FERTL
97. The Weber majority, by stating that the Kaiser plan was permissible, also im-
plied that there may be some voluntarily imposed quotas which are impermissible.
The majority did not state whether the Kaiser plan was middle-of-the-road or bor-
dering on impermissibility. Because of this lack of guidance, it is difficult to speculate
on what factual variations will make a program invalid. Id. at 2728-30.
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